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The New York Court of Appeals has, in effect, directed lower
courts to implement more efficient remedies, such as monetary
sanctions, to compel compliance with CPLR 3406(a).40 In light of
this directive, attorneys would be wise to abide by the mandatory
notice requirement time restraints pursuant to CPLR 3406(a) and
avoid possible pecuniary sanctions for failure to comply in a timely
manner pursuant to CPLR 3406(a).
Michael S. Re

GENERAL BusINEss LAW

GBL § 198-a(k): Lemon Law's alternative arbitrationmechanism
requiring an automobile manufacturer to submit to binding arbitration at the consumer's request is'constitutional
The New York State Legislature enacted its first new car
"Lemon Law" in 1983.1 This law, General Business Law section
198-a, was promulgated in response to numerous complaints by
consumers, who were dissatisfied with the myriad of confusing regulations and ineffective commercial law remedies available to
them.2 The Lemon Law, as originally adopted, provided the purN.Y. Laws 685 (McKinney); see also supra note 3 (discussing purposes of Reform Act).
40 Tewari, 75 N.Y.2d at 10-11, 549 N.E.2d at 1147, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 576; see [1986] 22

N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.56(a)(3) (1986); supra note 23 and accompanying text (listing other remedies as alternatives to dismissal). Futhermore, "every reported case granting permission for
a late filing has imposed the monetary sanctions provided by CPLR 2004 and the rule
202.56(a)(3)." Marte v. Montefiore Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 745, 751, 538 N.Y.S.2d 396,
400 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989); see Kirck v. Samaan, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1989, at 26, col. 4
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County) (sanction of $1,500 imposed); Collazo v. Fiasconaro, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
9, 1989, at 25, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County) ($3,500 sanction imposed).
I GBL § 198-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990). If a new car fails to conform to all
express warranties during the first two years or 18,000 miles, whichever is earlier, upon
timely notice to the manufacturer, the consumer is entitled to free repairs. Id. § 198-a(b)(1).
If, after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer is unable to repair a defect that
substantially diminishes the value of the car, the manufacturer must either replace the car
or refund its purchase price. Id. § 198-a(c)(1). For an overview of the development of the
Lemon Law in New York, see Abrams, New York Lemon Law ArbitrationProgram:Annual
Report-1987, 43 ARB. J. 36, 36-47 (Sept. 1988); Comment, New York's Used-Car Lemon
Law: An Evaluation, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 971, 989 (1986).
2 Abrams, supra note 1, at 36-37. Before 1983, the manufacturers' approach to con-
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chaser of a defective automobile with two options: i) to sue the
manufacturer;3 or ii) to submit a claim to the manufacturer's infor-

mal arbitration4 program. Responding to consumer complaints
about the expense of litigation and the inefficiency of the arbitration programs, 6 the legislature amended the GBL in 1987 to insumer complaints was a well-concealed farce. Id. They would establish consumer-assistance
programs, including hot lines, ostensibly to resolve consumer complaints, but, in fact, these
systems were designed to insulate the manufacturers and dealers from customer action. Id.
Consumers, dissatisfied with such procedures, were forced to seek legal redress under Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs the sale of goods. See Honigman, The
New "Lemon Laws": Expanding UCC Remedies, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 116, 116-19 (1984). The
U.C.C. offers two possible remedies for the car owner: (i) a suit for breach of warranty, or;
(ii) a suit for revocation of acceptance. See Comment, Sweetening the Fate of the Lemon
Law Owner: Californiaand Connecticut Pass Legislation Dealing with Defective New Cars,
14 U. TOL. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1983). U.C.C. section 2-608 provides that a buyer may revoke acceptance of a commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value
to him. Id.; see also Merola v. Atlas Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 70 App. Div. 2d 950, 950, 417
N.Y.S.2d 775, 775 (2d Dep't 1979) (action at law to recover purchase price of car following
revocation of acceptance); McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 761, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806, 810
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (buyer who discovers product does not conform may
revoke acceptance). Alternatively, the buyer can sue for breach of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1978); see
also McCormack v. Lynn Imports, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 905, 910, 452 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1982) (defendant merchant breached implied warranty of merchantability because car could not be safely driven).
I See GBL § 198-a(f) (McKinney 1988). The statute provides that "[n]othing in this
section shall in any way limit the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a
consumer under any other law." Id.
' See id. § 198-a(g). Historically, arbitration was met with much judicial hostility. See
Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942)
(generally courts unfriendly to arbitration agreements); Carbonneau, The Reception Of Arbitrationin the United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 266-68 (1988) (United States courts
espoused inhospitable view of arbitration); Bruff, Public Programs,Private Deciders; The
Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEx. L. REV. 441, 442-47 (1989)
(arbitration did not always enjoy judicial favor). However, commercial realities, eventually
compelled a reconsideration of arbitration. Carbonneau, supra, at 268. New York accepted
arbitration by passing the New York Arbitration Law in 1920. See Arbitration Law, ch. 275,
§ 2, [1920] N.Y. Laws 804 (McKinney).
' See GBL § 198-a(g) (McKinney 1988). The manufacturers' arbitration program must
conform to section 198-a(c). Id. This section provides that if the manufacturer, during the
warranty period, cannot repair a defect that substantially impairs the value of the car, it
must replace the vehicle with a comparable model or give a full refund of the purchase
price. See GBL § 198-a(c) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990).
8 See Abrams, supra note 1, at 36-37. Realistically, neither option afforded to consumers was effective. Id. The high price of litigation kept this remedy beyond the reach of most
consumers. Id. Participation in the manufacturers' arbitration program was too often an
exercise in futility, resulting in decisions that disregarded Lemon Law standards and, instead, directed further repairs. Id.; Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 799, N.Y.
Laws (Aug. 2, 1986), reprintedin [1986] N.Y. Laws 3202 (McKinney). However, it must be
added that the manufacturers' arbitration process was not binding upon the consumer,
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elude subsection 198-a(k) ("subsection (k)"),7 which provides consumers with the additional option of compelling the manufacturer
to submit to an alternative arbitration mechanism.$ The automobile industry opposed the arbitration mechanism vigorously on several constitutional grounds.' Recently, however, in Motor Vehicle
ManufacturersAssociation v. State,10 the Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the alternative arbitration mechanism provided for in subsection (k), finding that the manufacturer is not
denied a right to jury trial, as the remedy in subsection (k) is equi-

table and not legal in nature.1
In Manufacturers Association, the plaintiffs, trade associations representing automobile manufacturers, importers, and distributors, sought a declaratory judgment on the question of
whether subsection (k) was in conflict with the New York State
Constitution. 2 The state similarly moved for summary judgment
on the constitutional question. 3 The plaintiffs alleged that the alternative arbitration mechanism denied the manufacturers their
right to a trial by jury,14 abridged the state supreme court's juriswhereas under GBL § 198-a(k) arbitration is binding upon both the consumer and the manufacturer. See GBL § 198-a, commentary at 316-17 (McKinney 1988).
GBL § 198-a(k) (McKinney 1988). GBL section 198-a(k) provides, in pertinent part,
that: "Each consumer shall have the option of submitting any dispute arising under this
section . .

.

to an alternate arbitration mechanism established ...

by the New York state

attorney general." Id. "Upon application of the consumer... all manufacturers shall submit
to such alternate arbitration." Id.
8 See id.
' See Abrams, supra note 1, at 46-47. The auto industry has challenged Lemon Laws on
due process, equal protection, and first amendment grounds. See id.; see also General Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1990) (claimed Federal Trade Commission
preempted Lemon Law); Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192,
1200 (5th Cir. 1985) (Lemon Law did not violate due process); Automobile Importers of
America, Inc. v. Minn., 681 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (D. Minn. 1988) (plaintiff claimed Lemon
Law amounted to governmental taking of private property without just compensation as
required under constitution), afl'd, 871 F.2d 717 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201
(1989); General Motors Corp. v. Martine, 213 Conn. 136, 140-41, 567 A.2d 808, 810 (1989)
(Lemon Law did not violate jury rights). But see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United
States v. O'Neill, 212 Conn. 83, 93-98, 561 A.2d 917, 922-25 (1989) (Lemon Law violated
right of access to courts).
10 75 N.Y.2d 175, 550 N.E.2d 919, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1990).
" Id. at 187, 550 N.E.2d at 925, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
12 Id. at 179, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
Id. at 180, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
" Id. The New York Constitution states that "[t]rial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever." N.Y.
CONsT. art. I, § 2 (McKinney 1987); see Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y.
261, 273, 130 N.E. 288, 291 (1921); Chase v. Scalici, 97 App. Div. 2d 25, 27, 468 N.Y.S.2d
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diction, 1 5 was an unconstitutional delegation of authority, 6 and violated the State Administrative Procedure Act. 17 Granting the
state's motion, the trial court held that subsection (k) was constitutional.' 8 The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed.' 9
365, 367 (2d Dep't 1983). But see Penney v. Elmira Professional Communications, 131 App.
Div. 2d 938, 939, 516 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (3d Dep't 1987) (jury trial permitted upon demand
by any party following determination of arbitrators).
" ManufacturersAss'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 183, 550 N.E.2d at 923, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 474. The
New York Constitution states that "[t]he supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in law and equity." N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7a (McKinney 1987). The plaintiffs argued
that when a claim may be brought in a court of law, the state constitution requires that the
Supreme Court be permitted to determine that claim in every instance based on its own de
novo review of the law and the facts. ManufacturersAss'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 183, 550 N.E.2d at
923, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 474; see also In re Malloy, 278 N.Y. 429, 432, 17 N.E.2d 108, 109 (1938)
(Supreme Court has jurisdiction over matters from Surrogate's Court); Comiskey v. Arlen,
55 App. Div. 2d 304, 314-15, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129-30 (2d Dep't 1976) (medical panel's
factual findings not binding upon jury), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696 (1977); People v. Darling, 50
App. Div. 2d 1038, 1038, 377 N.Y.S.2d 718, 720-21 (3d Dep't 1975) (Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over matters from Criminal Court). Because the Lemon Law limits the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to CPLR article 75 review when a consumer elects compulsory arbitration in the first instance, plaintiffs argued that the Lemon Law provision produced an unconstitutional limitation of the Supreme Court's general original jurisdiction. Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 183, 550 N.E.2d at 923, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
'6 Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 185, 550 N.E.2d at 924, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 475. The
plaintiffs argued that they had a constitutional right to have a court or public officer adjudicate their disputes with consumers and that subsection (k) unconstitutionally delegated sovereign judicial power to private arbitrators. Id.; see also Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 911, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1353-54, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464, 467-69 (1987) (anti-smoking regulations
voided); County of Oneida v. Berle, 49 N.Y.2d 515, 523, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137, 427 N.Y.S.2d
407, 412 (1980) (budget director must spend funds as appropriated by legislature); Saxton v.
Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 550-51, 378 N.E.2d 95, 98-99, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (1978) (courts
will not police degree of detail in state's budget).
" Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 187-88, 550 N.E.2d at 925-26, 551 N.Y.S.2d at
476-77. The plaintiffs argued that the alternative arbitration mechanism established by the
Lemon Law violates the State Administrative Act, which requires that an arbitration decision include findings of fact, conclusions of law, or reasons for determination. See State
Administrative Procedure Act § 302(1) (McKinney Supp. 1990); see also In re Field Delivery Serv., 66 N.Y.2d 516, 520, 488 N.E.2d 1223, 1227, 498 N.Y.S.2d 111, 115 (1985) (administrative agency must indicate reason for departure from agency precedent); Gerzof v.
Gulotta, 87 Misc. 2d 768, 777, 386 N.Y.S.2d 790, 797 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976) (referee's report contained findings of fact and conclusions), modified, 57 App. Div. 2d 821, 395
N.Y.S.2d 26 (1st Dep't 1977).
18 Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 180, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
1' Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 146 App. Div. 2d 212, 221, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893
(3d Dep't 1989), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 550 N.E.2d 919, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1990). While finding the statute free from constitutional infirmity, the Appellate Division declared a portion
of the regulations implementing the statute to be invalid. Id. at 219-20, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
The regulation in question provides that arbitrators "shall not consider evidence that the
nonconformity, defect or condition can be corrected through further repairs." [1987] 13
N.Y.C.R.R. § 300.17(c). The court asserted that this regulation had the effect of converting
the presumption of reasonableness set forth in GBL § 198-a(d) into a conclusive presump-
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Writing for the Court of Appeals, Judge Simons rejected each
of the plaintiffs' arguments and upheld the Appellate Division's
decision. 20 The court concluded that since the remedies provided
by the Lemon Law are equitable in nature, there is no corresponding right to a jury trial under the state constitution.2 1 Additionally,
the court noted that the state supreme court would not lose jurisdiction since jurisdiction does not attach prior to a consumer's decision to litigate the claim in a court of law.22 The court reasoned
that the legislature "merely created a new cause of action" allowing one of the litigants to select the forum.2 3 Finally, after contion that "a reasonable effort to repair has been made where the vehicle has undergone four
repair attempts or remains out of service for 30 days." ManufacturersAss'n, 146 App. Div.
at 220, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
20 Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 180, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
Plaintiffs also claimed that the alternative arbitration mechanism violated their right to
procedural due process. Id. at 188, 550 N.E.2d at 926, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 477. However, the
court declined to address this argument since it was raised for the first time in the Appellate
Division. Id. But cf. Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 734 F. Supp. 86, 91 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (court
held that GBL § 198-a(k) is not violative of defendant's due process or equal protection
rights).
2! Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 180-83, 550 N.E.2d at 921-23, 551 N.Y.S.2d at
472-74. The court construed the New York Constitution to guarantee plaintiffs a jury trial
only in those cases in which the right had existed at common law. Id. at 180-81, 550 N.E.2d
at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 472. At common law, if the remedy sought was a legal one, the
plaintiff would be entitled to a jury trial, whereas if the remedy sought was an equitable
one, the case would be tried before a chancellor. Id. at 181, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d
at 472. The court found that the remedies provided by the Lemon Law were analogous to
specific performance. Id. at 182, 550 N.E.2d at 922, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 473. The Lemon Law, in
the court's view, "[w]as designed to produce, as nearly as practicable under the circumstances, the same performance promised under the contract." Id. Thus, the court concluded
that the Lemon Law was an equitable remedy and, therefore, the plaintiff had no right to a
jury trial. Id. The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled similarly on this issue in Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 212 Conn. 83, 561 A.2d 917 (1989), declaring that the remedies provided under Connecticut's Lemon Law were equitable in nature, thereby not mandating a jury trial. See id. at 91, 561 A.2d at 921-22.
22 Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 183-85, 550 N.E.2d at 923-24, 551 N.Y.S.2d at
474-75. The court reasoned that if a consumer chooses to litigate a Lemon Law claim, the
Supreme Court has full jurisdiction to adjudicate it. Id. at 184, 550 N.E.2d at 923, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 474. If the consumer chooses arbitration, the claim becomes litigable when either party seeks review of the award. Id. Further, the Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction to review the claim in such proceedings by applying the standards of CPLR article 75.
Id.

23 Id. at 184, 550 N.E.2d at 924, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 475. The court noted that the legislature has been vested with the power to "change or abolish common law causes of action," as
well as to "substitute new remedies." Id. at 184, 550 N.E.2d at 923, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
The legislature's enactment of subsection (k) was viewed by the court as analogous to the
legislature's creation of new causes of action in the past. Id. at 184, 550 N.E.2d at 923, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 475.
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sidering both the statute's detailed standards for selecting and
guiding the arbitrators as well as its provision for broad judicial
review, the court found the legislature's delegation of authority to
the arbitration panel to be consistent with the New York State
Constitution.24

Dissenting, Judge Titone argued that subsection (k) was unconstitutional in that it places a judicial function in the hands of
private arbitrators who cannot be held accountable through either
the electoral process25 or the Public Officers Law.26 Judge Titone
also found subsection (k) to be in violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. Allowing the legislature to bypass the judicial
process at its discretion, in Judge Titone's view, was the creation of
a precedent by the majority which would disrupt "the delicate balance governing the relationship among the various branches of
government.""
It is submitted that the court was correct in upholding the
constitutionality of subsection (k). By enacting subsection (k), the
legislature has not created an ad hoc arbitration tribunal whose
powers are unlimited by rules of law or evidence.2" The Lemon
3° provide specific stanLaw, and the regulations implementing it,
dards for selecting and directing the arbitrators. 1 Moreover, the
arbitrator is limited to awarding either one of two designated rem24 Id.
at 185-87, 550 N.E.2d at 924-25, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76. The court noted that its
previous holding in Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508,
311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970), stands for the proposition that the Legislature can delegate authority to an arbitration panel as long as adequate procedural safeguards are provided. See
Manufacturer'sAss'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 186, 550 N.E.2d at 925, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
" Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 189, 550 N.E.2d at 927, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 478
(Titone, J., dissenting).
28 Id. (Titone, J., dissenting); The New York Public Officers Law regulates the appointments and qualifications of those who work as officers of the state. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW. art.
II (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990).
2 Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 189, 550 N.E.2d at 927, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 478
(Titone, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 194, 550 N.E.2d at 930, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 481 (Titone, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 185, 550 N.E.2d at 924, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 475 (citing Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v.

Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970)).
20 See [1987] N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 300.1-300.19.
'1 See Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 185, 550 N.E.2d at 924, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
Arbitrators acting pursuant to the Lemon Law must first undergo training. [1987]
N.Y.C.R.R. § 300.7(e). "This training shall include procedural techniques, the duties and
responsibilities of arbitrators under the program, and the substantive provisions of General
Business Law, section 198-a." Id. Furthermore, "[tihe arbitrator assigned shall not have any
bias, any financial or personal interest in the outcome of the hearing, or any current connection to the sale or manufacture of motor vehicles." [1987] N.Y.C.R.R. § 300.7(b).
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edies: i) a replacement vehicle of comparable value; or ii) a refund
of the full purchase price.32 This relief can be granted only when
the arbitrator has determined that after a reasonable number of
attempts the manufacturer has been unable to repair a defect
which substantially impairs the value of the motor vehicle.3 Further, if either party is dissatisfied with the arbitrator's determination, that party can seek judicial review under CPLR article 75.34
The goal of the Lemon Law as originally enacted was the
"swift and equitable resolution of consumer complaints. 3 5 Prior to
the passage of subsection (k), this objective barely had been
reached. 6 Under the original statute, consumers either had to seek
redress in the courts or through nonbinding arbitration programs
established by the manufacturers. 7 This approach often proved
very costly and resulted in long delays and inequitable awards.38
Subsection (k) represents an attempt by the legislature to achieve
a just and equitable solution to a long-standing problem." While
the question of whether subsection (k) will achieve this goal remains open, the Court of Appeals undoubtedly was correct in its
conclusion that the means by which the legislature has sought to
11 See ManufacturersAss'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 186, 550 N.E.2d at 924, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 475;
see also Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 734 F. Supp. 86, 93 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("arbitrators are not
free to fashion their own awards, regardless of a case's equities, but are restricted to denying
or granting a consumer a predictable and limited form of relief"). Consequential damages
are not recoverable under the Lemon Law. See Volvo North America v. DePaola, 156 App.
Div. 2d 40, 43, 554 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (1st Dep't 1990). However, section 198-a(1), as
amended in 1988, provides that a court may award reasonable attorney's fees "to a consumer who prevails in any judicial action or proceeding arising out of an arbitration proceeding held pursuant to subdivision (k)." GBL § 198-a(l) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990).
This section was amended to prevent protracted post-arbitration litigation meant to wear
down the consumer. See GBL § 198-a, commentary at 25 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
11 See ManufacturersAss'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 186, 550 N.E.2d at 924, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
31 Id. at 186, 550 N.E.2d at 925, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 476; Lyeth, 734 F. Supp. at 91. The
arbitrator's decision must be "in accord with due process and supported by adequate evidence in the record." Manufacturers Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 186, 550 N.E.2d at 925, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 476. Furthermore, the decision "must be rational and satisfy the arbitrary and
capricious standards of CPLR article 78." Id.
" See Lyeth, 734 F. Supp. at 89; Abrams, supra note 1, at 36.
" See Governor's Approval Memorandum (N.Y.S. 8342-A, N.Y.A. 10540, 209th Sess.),
reprinted in [1986] N.Y.S. LEGIS. ANN. 334, cited in Lyeth, 734 F. Supp. at 90; Abrams,
supra note 1, at 36-39.
17 See ManufacturersAss'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 179, 550 N.E.2d at 920, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
33 Id.
3 See id. at 179-80, 550 N.E.2d at 920-21, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 471-72; Abrams, supra note
1, at 38-39.

412

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:2:405

achieve its objective is valid under the New York State
Constitution.
Matthew Tracy

